No single element of the nuclear deterrent - neither submarine, nor missile, nor warhead - is independent despite politicians saying that is what we must have.
Kate Hudson is the general secretary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
‘How many missile tubes does it take to arm a submarine?’ sounds a bit like a bad joke on a Christmas cracker. Nevertheless it has become a matter of at least modest interest over the past few days. As government plans for detailed design work on a new generation of nuclear weapons submarines were announced in the Commons last week, such esoteric questions momentarily achieved national exposure.
In fact, we should all be interested in the numbers of missile tubes planned for new nuclear subs. Obviously because of the costs involved, but also because it isn’t just a technical question about military kit – it is a political question which will have a political impact.
When the Strategic Defence and Security Review was launched last October, a number of reductions were announced to Britain’s nuclear weapons system. Most significantly, the stockpile of warheads was to be reduced, but David Cameron also announced that the number of warheads actually on the subs was to be reduced too.
This then means, of course, that you need fewer missiles to launch them with, and fewer tubes to house the missiles. So far so good. But what happens when – supposedly in a bid to save money – you are working on a common missile compartment with another user, in this case the United States, whose requirements turn out to be rather different? This seems to be what has happened with the missile tubes question.
Basically, it seems the Brits want eight and the US prefer 16, so they are compromising on 12. As other commentators have pointed out, presumably that means we are paying more for something that is larger than we need. But it also raises another question about our special nuclear relationship with the US and our so-called ‘independent’ nuclear weapons system.
We already lease the missiles from the US – now the tubes will be a co-production; we use US technology for many aspects of the design, production and targeting of the weapons – including spending money in the US on reactor design (nuclear reactors propel the subs) in recent months. Indeed we are also working with the French now on aspects of warhead production.
So the result of all this is that no single element of the system – neither submarine, nor missile, nor warhead – is independent despite politicians repeated proclaiming the need for an “independent nuclear deterrent”.
24 Responses to “Memo to Westminster: UK “independent nuclear deterrent” not actually independent”
Mike Wiltshire
Memo to Westminster: UK "independent nuclear deterrent" not actually independen: http://bit.ly/lUUfw3 by @CNDuk's Kate Hudson
13eastie
This is perhaps the most obtuse post I have seen on LFF.
It is quite impossible to discern whatever point it is that you think you’re making, but the claims you make are nonsensical.
“Basically, it seems the Brits want eight and the US prefer 16, so they are compromising on 12. As other commentators have pointed out, presumably that means we are paying more for something that is larger than we need”
Really? You don’t know much about engineering or manufacturing, do you? Which do you think would be the most cost-effective solution?
a) Specify, engineer and build an 8-tube boat on our own
b) Pay for a 16-tube boat built to US spec
c) Pay for a smaller, cheaper 12-tube boat built to joint US/UK spec
(You do know that our Vanguard boats differ from the US’s Ohio-class subs in exactly this regard already?)
We would actually get better value for money with a shared design, and it would give us a greater capability than we could afford on our own. The more similar the boats are, the more economies of scale there are likely to be operationally too, since it will increase the mutual compatibility of naval bases in the Clyde and on both US coasts.
“…no single element of the system – neither submarine, nor missile, nor warhead…is independent”
We have never really had an “independent” nuclear deterrent, ever since the Americans recruited our truly independent scientific progress to the Manhattan project. Hence, the Americans are also bereft of an “independent” deterrent.
What is the problem?
There is no-one outside the UK chain of command involved in the launch procedure. If sole ownership of intellectual property is your concern (I’ve no idea to whom the CND propose we might sell this, there being no other benefit from having it), then if this were a genuine issue, we might expect the Pentagon to be a little more worried about it than the CND. (They’ve had 53 years to get uptight about using the UK as a source of plutonium after all).
What is your point?
mr. Sensible
Dave I think we only need look at the likes of Iran to see why we need a nuclear deterrent.
I think the government have effectively ducked a decision on this for political purposes.
Trevor A Smith
If the missiles are leased from the US do we not have to ask the owner or permission to fire them?
Do we have independent launch codes?
Andy
“It is true that it is frankly inconceivable we would use our nuclear deterrent(sic) alone, without the US…”
“So, after some genuine consideration and reconsideration, I opted to renew it. But the contrary decision would not have been stupid”
Tony Blair, “A Journey, p635/6.