There are fears over the Lib-Con government's 55 per cent threshold for a successful dissolution resolution. But this could be overplayed.
Analysis by UCL’s Constitution Unit suggests that fears over the Lib-Con government’s 55 per cent threshold for a successful dissolution resolution. But a fixed-term parliament of five years would be “long by comparison with most other [parliamentary] systems”.
Yesterday’s coalition agreement of the Liberal Conservative government said:
“legislation will be brought forward to make provision for fixed term parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the House votes in favour.”
The Guardian today quotes Scott Styles, a senior lecturer in law at Aberdeen University, who described the move as “dangerous”. He went on to say:
“This is a major and fundamental alteration in our constitution; what is being changed is not a right of the PM but a power of the Commons. The British constitution is very simple: he who commands the confidence of the House is PM, he who loses that confidence must resign.
“I simply do not see how such a rule is credible or can be enforced: a majority is a majority is 51%; not 55% or 60% or 80%.”
Meanwhile constitutional expert Peter Hennessy, of Queen Mary University of London University, told BBC News:
“Fifty-five per cent of MPs needed for a government to lose a confidence vote – I am not sure that’s a very sensible change.
“The tradition is that one [vote] is enough and I wouldn’t tinker with that. I would leave that well alone. It looks as if you are priming the pitch, doctoring it a bit. Not good. It’s meant to be a different politics, new politics.”
But in a briefing note on the proposed changes prepared for Left Foot Forward by UCL’s Constitution Unit, Robert Hazel writes:
“The Conservative-Lib Dem coalition agreement proposes a 55 per cent threshold before Parliament can be dissolved. This is intended to strengthen the hand of the Lib Dems: Cameron could not call an early election without the consent of his coalition partners, because the Conservatives command only 47 per cent of the votes in the Commons.
“Some commentators appear to have confused a dissolution resolution moved by the government, and a confidence motion tabled by the opposition. On no confidence motions tabled by the opposition parties, the normal 50% threshold should continue to apply.”
But while fixed term parliaments are becoming “increasingly common”, five year terms would be “long by comparison with most other [parliamentary] systems”. Robert Hazel writes:
“Australia and New Zealand both have three-year maximum terms. The legislatures of Canada and many of its provinces have four-year fixed terms, as do most Australian states. The devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have four-year fixed terms. Ireland’s lower house has a five-year maximum, as in the UK. So a five year term is long by comparison with most other Westminster systems.”
All this begs the question of whether 55 per cent is too low a threshold for a dissolution resolution. If the point of a fixed term parliament is that the governing party cannot dissolve parliament to suit itself, perhaps the threshold should be two-thirds as in both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.
The Constitution Unit of UCL has prepared a longer briefing note on fixed term parliaments.
99 Responses to “Is 55% too low?”
Alix
@Scharman,
“does it still mean that a simple majority would force the PM to see the Queen to seek a dissolution.”
A simple majority certainly still topples the government. But parliament – which is elected – gets the opportunity to choose another before dissolution. As I understand it, at the moment, the Queen theoretically gets to ask if anyone else can form a majority instead, and only if it’s not the case does she grant dissolution. All this measure does is allows MPs to overrule that process – transfers powers from the crown to the legislature. The bar being set as low as it is allows MPs to very easily call for dissolution and not allow a new government to be formed.
So yes, if we’re going to do this properly, it should be higher, and four years would have been ideal. It’s generally messy to do it this way, and it should be done as part of a full constitutional review/convention, which was what the Lib Dem manifesto called for. But Labour’s manifesto called for fixed term parliaments too, and where there are fixed parliaments, there have to be additional safeguards on dissolution, so this hasn’t exactly come out of the blue. It’s a campaigning success for all the pro-democracy groups – and a reflection of what already happens in Scotland and Wales – which seems to have surprised literally everyone inside the M25 and/or who doesn’t usually give a toss about politics. Classic case of decisions being made by those who turn up, maybe.
Alix
@ConfusedofCroydon
“seems to have surprised literally everyone inside the M25”
No offence 🙁
Matthew
“This is intended to strengthen the hand of the Lib
Dems: Cameron could not call an early election without the consent of his coalition partners, because the Conservatives command only 47 per cent of the votes in the Commons.
How could Cameron call an early election if the threshold was 50%, if he only has 47% of the votes?
Jim Pickard
Hazel seems to be right. Which would make the likes of Denis Macshane (who claimed Callaghan would have survived at 55 per cent) wrong. V.good point.
Sunder Katwala
This seems to me to be too sanguine. The 55% appears very convenient, and I have not seen a clear answer to the question of what happens in the event of a no confidence vote.
Under these proposals, in 1979,
(1) could Jim Callaghan have advised the Queen that Michael Foot had now reached a supply and confidence arrangement with the SNP and SDLP so Labour could stay in office after losing a confidence vote. It seems to me that they would allow that. It would make a major difference to the impact of a confidence motion if that is the case.
(2) If that was not possible, and Callaghan advised the Queen to send for Margaret Thatcher, would Thatcher have been unable to call an election without Labour support?
Can supporters of the proposal clarify whether they believe this to be the case? There are arguments for and against this.
There are a whole range of ways to run fixed term Parliaments as the rule or the norm. But these can allow for dissolution in the case of no confidence. (That happens after a time delay in Scotland, I think 28 days), so there is a 50% no confidence route to a dissolution as well as an ability to trigger it with a higher threshold.
No confidence is very exceptional – we had two such votes half a century apart. It is perfectly possible (especially while we have Fptp or AV) to combine fixed terms as the norm without the impact on no confidence, even if that might be a softer form of fixed terms than some want. (That would have given a fixed term in almost every Parliament). It is a political decision whether to do that or not – so I do am not persuaded that this policy is a necessary consequence of fixed terms, nor with the idea that there has been no partisan motivation from the Tories in agreeing it on this basis.