There are fears over the Lib-Con government's 55 per cent threshold for a successful dissolution resolution. But this could be overplayed.
Analysis by UCL’s Constitution Unit suggests that fears over the Lib-Con government’s 55 per cent threshold for a successful dissolution resolution. But a fixed-term parliament of five years would be “long by comparison with most other [parliamentary] systems”.
Yesterday’s coalition agreement of the Liberal Conservative government said:
“legislation will be brought forward to make provision for fixed term parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the House votes in favour.”
The Guardian today quotes Scott Styles, a senior lecturer in law at Aberdeen University, who described the move as “dangerous”. He went on to say:
“This is a major and fundamental alteration in our constitution; what is being changed is not a right of the PM but a power of the Commons. The British constitution is very simple: he who commands the confidence of the House is PM, he who loses that confidence must resign.
“I simply do not see how such a rule is credible or can be enforced: a majority is a majority is 51%; not 55% or 60% or 80%.”
Meanwhile constitutional expert Peter Hennessy, of Queen Mary University of London University, told BBC News:
“Fifty-five per cent of MPs needed for a government to lose a confidence vote – I am not sure that’s a very sensible change.
“The tradition is that one [vote] is enough and I wouldn’t tinker with that. I would leave that well alone. It looks as if you are priming the pitch, doctoring it a bit. Not good. It’s meant to be a different politics, new politics.”
But in a briefing note on the proposed changes prepared for Left Foot Forward by UCL’s Constitution Unit, Robert Hazel writes:
“The Conservative-Lib Dem coalition agreement proposes a 55 per cent threshold before Parliament can be dissolved. This is intended to strengthen the hand of the Lib Dems: Cameron could not call an early election without the consent of his coalition partners, because the Conservatives command only 47 per cent of the votes in the Commons.
“Some commentators appear to have confused a dissolution resolution moved by the government, and a confidence motion tabled by the opposition. On no confidence motions tabled by the opposition parties, the normal 50% threshold should continue to apply.”
But while fixed term parliaments are becoming “increasingly common”, five year terms would be “long by comparison with most other [parliamentary] systems”. Robert Hazel writes:
“Australia and New Zealand both have three-year maximum terms. The legislatures of Canada and many of its provinces have four-year fixed terms, as do most Australian states. The devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have four-year fixed terms. Ireland’s lower house has a five-year maximum, as in the UK. So a five year term is long by comparison with most other Westminster systems.”
All this begs the question of whether 55 per cent is too low a threshold for a dissolution resolution. If the point of a fixed term parliament is that the governing party cannot dissolve parliament to suit itself, perhaps the threshold should be two-thirds as in both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.
The Constitution Unit of UCL has prepared a longer briefing note on fixed term parliaments.
99 Responses to “Is 55% too low?”
Modicum
The programme for government states:
“legislation will be brought forward to make provision for fixed term parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the House votes in favour.”
This isn’t stating that it will take 55% to pass a vote of no confidence and such a change would be highly unlikely.
There seems to be some confusion in that some commenters think that a vote of no confidence automatically leads to a dissolution. As I understand it a vote of no confidence means that either (1) the PM must resign or (2) he must dissolve parliament. So I take it that in future the PM will no longer automatically have the second option.
It’s not clear to me what would happen if the PM resigned but refused to advise the Queen on a successor. She would probably have to get politically involved and invite someone to form a government. I very much doubt that the new legislation is going to codify the complex conventions around choosing a Prime Minister (that would be quite a radical step) so we will probably have to wait and see what new conventions are created under the new system over time.
Modicum
@Elaine
Just out of curiosity, do you support a written constitution? Because I think it is wishful thinking to expect politicians to engage in “wide and deep discussion” or to have a referendum unless they are obliged to do so by a constitution.
Mr. Sensible
I fully support the principle of fixed-turm parliaments, but think this particular move is politically motivated.
Why 55%? Why not just simple majority?
I mean, in a fragile situation like this, if the Lib Dems walk away we could end up with a long period of stalemate.
So, fixed-term parliaments yes, but I think they should be for 4 years, and motions of confidence, no confidence or mutual disolution should be decided by simple majority.
Elaine
Modicum
I sway towards a written constitution, but am quite open-minded on this issue.
I think you can still make the argument about the democratic legitimacy of constitutional change without arguing for a written constitution.
(BTW I was already aware of arrangements in Wales, Scotland and other parliamentary democracies.)
I don’t think this issue requires a referendum in and of itself, but it is not trivial.
It should have been very clearly flagged, with different options and specific optons outlined, and been made part of the debate on political reform during the election campaign. One sentence ‘about fixed parliaments’ in a manifesto is insufficient. I think your (Modicum’s) observations render my argument more powerful.
My point about the Mail and Telegraph is not that it would be a legitimate critique – rather about media bias.
tim f
This seems crackers.
Technically you could have 51% consistently voting down everything apart from repeated motions of no confidence, but fall short of the 55% needed for dissolution.
I fail to see what is wrong with the current system where a motion of no confidence of repeatedly voting down the government effectively forces the PM into dissolving parliament. (I also fail to see the attraction of fixed term parliaments full stop.)