There are fears over the Lib-Con government's 55 per cent threshold for a successful dissolution resolution. But this could be overplayed.
Analysis by UCL’s Constitution Unit suggests that fears over the Lib-Con government’s 55 per cent threshold for a successful dissolution resolution. But a fixed-term parliament of five years would be “long by comparison with most other [parliamentary] systems”.
Yesterday’s coalition agreement of the Liberal Conservative government said:
“legislation will be brought forward to make provision for fixed term parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the House votes in favour.”
The Guardian today quotes Scott Styles, a senior lecturer in law at Aberdeen University, who described the move as “dangerous”. He went on to say:
“This is a major and fundamental alteration in our constitution; what is being changed is not a right of the PM but a power of the Commons. The British constitution is very simple: he who commands the confidence of the House is PM, he who loses that confidence must resign.
“I simply do not see how such a rule is credible or can be enforced: a majority is a majority is 51%; not 55% or 60% or 80%.”
Meanwhile constitutional expert Peter Hennessy, of Queen Mary University of London University, told BBC News:
“Fifty-five per cent of MPs needed for a government to lose a confidence vote – I am not sure that’s a very sensible change.
“The tradition is that one [vote] is enough and I wouldn’t tinker with that. I would leave that well alone. It looks as if you are priming the pitch, doctoring it a bit. Not good. It’s meant to be a different politics, new politics.”
But in a briefing note on the proposed changes prepared for Left Foot Forward by UCL’s Constitution Unit, Robert Hazel writes:
“The Conservative-Lib Dem coalition agreement proposes a 55 per cent threshold before Parliament can be dissolved. This is intended to strengthen the hand of the Lib Dems: Cameron could not call an early election without the consent of his coalition partners, because the Conservatives command only 47 per cent of the votes in the Commons.
“Some commentators appear to have confused a dissolution resolution moved by the government, and a confidence motion tabled by the opposition. On no confidence motions tabled by the opposition parties, the normal 50% threshold should continue to apply.”
But while fixed term parliaments are becoming “increasingly common”, five year terms would be “long by comparison with most other [parliamentary] systems”. Robert Hazel writes:
“Australia and New Zealand both have three-year maximum terms. The legislatures of Canada and many of its provinces have four-year fixed terms, as do most Australian states. The devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have four-year fixed terms. Ireland’s lower house has a five-year maximum, as in the UK. So a five year term is long by comparison with most other Westminster systems.”
All this begs the question of whether 55 per cent is too low a threshold for a dissolution resolution. If the point of a fixed term parliament is that the governing party cannot dissolve parliament to suit itself, perhaps the threshold should be two-thirds as in both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.
The Constitution Unit of UCL has prepared a longer briefing note on fixed term parliaments.
99 Responses to “Is 55% too low?”
Sunder Katwala
The idea this protects the LibDems from the Tories …. maybe. It is very clear it does the opposite:
Today, if the LibDems walk out, the non-Tory parties can get an election if they want to insist on one.
If passed, the Tories on their own on 47% have a veto on a dissolution. They would appear to have a veto on the timing of a dissolution if a Labour leader of the Opposition was called in as PM of a minority coalition, and wanted a dissolution.
Sunder Katwala
Alix
“The Queen gets to ask if anyone” … the politically crucial point of our current arrangements is surely that the Queen gets to ask the outgoing PM for their advice on who might be given the opportunity, and can not under our current conventions call for somebody except through such advce from the PM.
If the fixed terms legislation and/or amended hung Parliament conventions/rules were to, for example, insist that if there was No Confidence carried that the Leader of the Opposition would be given a chance to try to form a government on the resignation of a PM, then the supermajority on dissolution could be a more plausible argument, though that depends on views on the new constraint of action on a new minority PM.
Anthony Zacharzewski
Sunder:
I think that your (1) is true assuming we retain the view that the Queen must accept advice from the outgoing PM. (2) is certainly true, I don’t think the plain words of the proposal can be read any other way.
I also agree that it’s a bad policy.
Adam Croft
@beltain35 Also: http://bit.ly/clmKjE / http://bit.ly/9Kt7YV
kevin
I thought that changes to parliament should be endorsed by ballot/referendum of the voting populace this move smacks of dictatorship to me