The government’s nuclear weapons policy is still dictated by a decision made in 1962

Britain’s ability to deploy nuclear weapons has come to rely increasingly on US technology


When Britain sends its nuclear armed submarines on patrol they are three-quarters empty. By that I mean that each boat carries 40 nuclear weapons, rather than the 192 warheads its 16 missiles are capable of delivering to separate targets. Why, you might ask, does Britain spend money on an advanced weapons system whose capacity it doesn’t use?

The answer is partly the legacy of history, where Britain’s ability to deploy nuclear weapons has come to rely increasingly on US technology, and partly the transformation in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War.

Britain’s deterrent has been losing its independent character since the 1960s. In the aftermath of the Second World War Britain began the acquisition of nuclear weapons, testing its first atom bomb in 1952 and its first H-bomb in 1958. Initially these bombs were carried on long range bombers, but fearing the development of anti-aircraft measures Britain decided to buy an American air-launched missile known as Skybolt.  

When President Kennedy cancelled the programme, British prime minister Harold Macmillan rushed to Nassau for a hastily arranged summit, lobbying to keep Britain in the nuclear club. A sympathetic Kennedy made an offer that defined Britain’s nuclear future. Rather than revive the Skybolt programme, he offered to sell Britain the submarine-launched Polaris missiles.

Upgrading to Polaris gave Britain a far more advanced nuclear system than it had been looking for. In addition, as strategic doctrine developed, submarine launched systems came to be seen to have many advantages, not least that they were best placed to survive a ‘first strike’.

One quid pro quo for this generous offer was that the missiles would be committed to NATO, who would decide the targeting. Independent use of the missile was possible only in a case of ‘supreme national interest’.

Fast forward to the 1980s: the Polaris fleet of four submarines carrying 16 missiles could not go on forever, and the government decided to look for a successor. Its first choice was the Trident C4 missile. Each missile would be capable of delivering eight warheads to separate targets (compared to Polaris which could send three warheads spread out over a single target). Unlike Polaris, Britain would not buy but would lease the missiles drawing them from a pool owned and maintained in the US.

In an echo of 1962, the US decided to limit the C4 programme and step up to the D5 missile. The D5 was larger, more powerful, more accurate and capable of delivering 12 independently targeted warheads. For Britain the choice was to stick with the C4 for as long as the US would keep it in service or to go with the upgrade.

The government opted to build the larger submarines the D5 missile needed but committed itself not to increase the number of warheads. Once again Britain bought into a more powerful weapon system than its strategy required.

The Trident decision was taken at the height of the Cold War. Britain and its NATO allies faced Soviet Union’s tanks, infantry, and air forces stationed in Warsaw Pact countries, mainly East Germany Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Both sides had short range nuclear weapons on the territory of their allies. Even at that time, Trident was more than the UK’s defence policy needed.

When the first boat set sail in 1994 the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union had been dissolved, East Germany had merged with the Federal Republic and Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were applying for membership of NATO. Short and medium range nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Europe. Disarmament treaties, firstly between the US and USSR and then between the US and Russia, had begun to cut the number of strategic nuclear weapons by more than 80 per cent.  

In this new context Trident was understood to be even more of an exaggeration than before. In 1998, following a strategic defence review, the government announced that each submarine would carry no more than 48 warheads on eight missiles. The warhead limit was cut to no more than 40 in 2010

The image that comes to mind is of a child wearing an adult’s overcoat. It looked wrong in winter, and it is bizarre in summer.

That is the background to the Conservative government’s decision to build four new submarines to carry Trident missiles into the future. Despite the fact that the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies are now in the EU, and indeed the Baltic states that were once part of the Soviet Union are now members of both the EU and NATO, Trident remains.

It seems that Britain’s current choices are dependent on a path set by US generosity in 1962. The options are narrowing to Trident or nothing. If the UK gives up strategic nuclear weapons it may not be because of a positive decision to disarm but rather that the country has not the means to escape its history. Ironically Trident renewal may ultimately be the road to unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Jos Gallacher is a Brussels-based economic development professional

12 Responses to “The government’s nuclear weapons policy is still dictated by a decision made in 1962”

  1. jonlivesey

    This is a truly stupid piece. The real point about Trident is that a submarine based deterrent is highly survivable. For a nation like the UK, that is crucial. Any other form of deterrent – aircraft based or land based – would simply be an invitation to a first strike by an aggressor. How many warheads each submarine carries is irrelevant. The point is that a survivable system is stabilizing because it does *not* invite a first strike. Trident is a second strike system. In other words, if you want to have a nuclear deterrent at all, and you only want to pay for one leg of the three available, Trident is obviously the ideal choice. It is the only one that is guaranteed to be available, which is a key part of what deterrence *means*.

    What we have here is an “economic development professional” – whatever *that* means – giving us his expert view of Trident, when he does not grasp the single most important characteristic of the system.

    And I won’t even comment on the sneering and dismissive language he uses when describing the UK.

  2. Eventualpeace

    What a load of bollo*ks it’s people like you that hide under the protection of a weapon system such as trident but jump up and down talking of what a wage of money it is! The fact that literally tens of thousands of jobs rely upon a new class of submarine and its weapon system doesn’t compute into your *economic* expert brain. Do me a favour and go and campaign for nuclear disarmament along with your tree hugging friends in North Korea, I’m positive that they’ll be extremely accommodationg in any discussion or ideas you have.

  3. TruthBeatsLies

    You just did…!!!

  4. TruthBeatsLies

    Thousands of jobs engaged in armaments should be of no concern to a peaceful Socialist society. If people want jobs building or desperately maintaining unnecessary and obsolete nuclear weapons, let them take their worthless expertise to any country that wants them.

  5. Ian Wigg

    It could be equally argued that thousands of jobs engaged in polluting industries such as coal mining, steel production, automotive manufacturing should be of no concern to a green, environmentally aware Socialist society. If people want jobs building or desperately maintaining unnecessarily polluting products, let them take their worthless expertise to any country that wants them. On that basis I guess you were more than happy to say screw the miners, screw the steel workers and kick all the automotive workers onto the dole!

  6. Robin Green

    If we want to have a nuclear deterrent, you are probably right that we want a submarine one. But that is the question – do we want a nuclear deterrent? It is not an independent one – it has not been independent for decades – and if Jeremy Corbyn would never use it, we’d be better off scrapping it and redirecting the money that would have been spent on it to other more productive uses.

  7. Jos Gallacher

    I think I mention that in paragraph 5.

  8. Bradley B.

    Not quite. You assumed a first strike and DID NOT emphasise the greater prevention power of subs.

  9. Jos Gallacher

    In a short article it is not possible to go into detail on every aspect of the issue, nevertheless I did cover the fact that strategic doctrine accords advantages to SLBM’s including survivability.

  10. madasafish

    Well this is not a soclalist society so your argument falls at your first sentence.


    It is not all that complicated. We give up the deterrent and we could be attacked and the attacker knows there will be no retaliation. Anti defense idiots think humans are a nice species.

  12. André Balsa

    I am grateful to Jos Gallacher, the author of the article above, for providing the historical background for the current choices in the UK’s nuclear weapons policies.
    Further, I agree with him that given the current geo-political situation in Europe, the continued investments in modernization of an independent nuclear arsenal make little sense, and that in fact applies to both the UK and France: both countries could unilaterally get rid of their entire nuclear arsenal (and associated monumental maintenance expenses) without any loss in perceived or real national security.
    NATO has enough warheads (160-200) deployed all over Europe (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Italy) already, making the French and British independent nuclear arsenals rather irrelevant from a purely strategic point of view.
    Sadly, rationality has never been a major consideration when it comes to nuclear weapons. It is quite improbable that either the UK or France will embark on the road to nuclear disarmament, notwithstanding the huge costs of modernization and maintenance of their respective nuclear arsenals and delivery systems, or the urgency to address other more pressing issues such as terrorism, the arrival in Europe of millions of war refugees, or catastrophic climate change.

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